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The notion of °exicurity was introduced in the late 1990s. It promotes the idea of compensa-
tion of deregulation of labour markets (= °exibilization) by advantages in employment and
social security, in particularly for °exibly employed (other than permanent full-time, called
also atypically employed). This paper suggests an operational de¯nition of °exicurity, tak-
ing into account di®erent views of liberals and trade unions. The corresponding °exicurity
indices are derived from (a) data on the dynamics of employment types, (b) scores of the
strictness of employment protection legislation provided by the OECD, and (c) qualitative
juridical data on social security.
To convert the latter into numbers, eight employment types (permanent full-time, ¯xed-
term part-time, etc.) in 16 European countries are ranked with respect to their eligibility to
¯ve social security bene¯ts (unemployment insurance, public pensions, etc). To avoid known
shortages of ranking, the Method of Total Ranks is proposed. The ranks replace continuous
variables as index entries, and a dedicated model estimates the total index error which results
from such an `ordinal rounding' of the index input.
The °exicurity indices are calculated for 16 European countries for the years 1994{
2003. Contrary to theoretical opinions, the current deregulation of European labour mar-
kets is not compensated by improvements in the social security. If the °exicurity advan-
tages/disadvantages are accounted proportionally to the size of a®ected groups then the
factual trends are negative even from the viewpoint of liberals, to say nothing of trade
unions. The reciprocity of the advantages/disadvantages turns out to be illusory, because
gains are smaller than losses and winners are fewer than losers. Thereby the study warns
against promoting °exicurity policies with no operational control and empirical feedback.
Keywords: Flexicurity, employment security, social security, employment protection legis-
lation, European Union, statistical indices.
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1 Introduction: Economical and social background
The general employment insecurity has signi¯cantly increased in Europe in the recent two
decades. In addition to unemployment, the number of atypically employed, like part-time,
¯xed-term, or self-employed, has disproportionately grown since the 1980s (EuroStat 2003).
The atypical employment is not only less secured but also provides less carrier prospects
and training chances (OECD 2002, p. 156{159). Besides, it often disquali¯es workers from
social bene¯ts, since the eligibility of atypically employed is substantially lower than that of
permanently employed (OECD 2002, p. 131). The growth of atypical employment can be
explained by several factors.
1. Globalization. Investments under globalization are easily made worldwide, industries
and services move from one country to another, making permanent employment restric-
tive for e±cient economic performance. The collapse of the Socialist Block gave way
to unconstrained capitalism. The market economy became total, imposing economic
priorities over social ones.
To improve the competitiveness of ¯rms in the background of exporting industries
to countries with a cheap labour, European employers required for a liberalization of
national economies; for the deregulation of labour markets see Esping-Andersen and
Regini (2000). Some governments yielded their pressure, the employment protection
legislation (EPL) became more relaxed, resulting in a number of negative e®ects on
labour market and social structure (OECD 1999, section 2).
2. Rapid technological changes. Expanding information technologies are often im-
plemented within relatively short-time projects. Some projects are realized by small
temporary teams with a limited longevity and even by single individuals. These par-
ticularities and dynamics are transmitted to all branches which use information tech-
nologies and depend on their updates. Thus, the share of temporary employment in
the total employment in France, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain doubled or tripled dur-
ing 1985{2000, attaining in Spain 35% (OECD 2002, p. 133). The annual growth of
self-employment in the non-agricultural sector in the OECD countries in 1990{1998
was 1.7%, whereas that of civilian employment 1% (OECD 2000, p. 159).
3. Long-term unemployment. During the 1990s the long-term unemployment in the
OECD countries has become a more serious problem then before. In 1990 the unem-
ployed for 6{12 months and for more than 12 months constituted respectively 44.6 and
30.9% of all unemployed. In 1998 these ¯gures attained 48.6 and 33.4% (OECD 2002, p.
322). This means that the average duration of unemployment together with the share
of long-term unemployment in the total unemployment has increased. This structural
change signalizes about an unusual social process. Its consequence is that the workers
having experienced a long-time unemployment \are more likely to be o®ered shorter
contracts than other workers" (OECD 2002, p. 156).
94. Immigration. As stated by the OECD (2001, p. 171), \While admissions of new
permanent foreign workers are currently very few in number, especially in the European
OECD countries, the temporary employment of foreigners appear to be becoming more
widespread. ::: The temporary employment of foreign workers introduces °exibility
into the labour market." Moreover, foreigners are overrepresented among long-term
unemployed (OECD 2001, p. 181{182) whose chances to get a `normal' permanent job
are relatively low (OECD 2002, p. 156).
5. High welfare. Finally, high earnings and accumulated welfare in some European
countries enabled a fraction of the population to turn to part-time jobs. For instance,
the demand for part-time employment by full-time employed in the Netherlands is
twice larger than vice versa. For women this ratio is even higher and surpasses three
times (OECD 1999, p. 33).
Growth of atypical employment and intensive labour market transitions (Schmid and
Gazier 2002) result in a new social situation which should be adequately re°ected in the
public policy. In most of the post-war Europe, employment relations were regulated by a
rather constraining employment protection legislation and by collective agreements between
employers and trade unions. The actual contradiction between the °exibilization pursued by
employers and strict labour market regulation defended by trade unions makes topical the
discussion on °exibilization and employment protection legislation with regard to economical
performance and unemployment.
The pro's and contra's labour market regulation/°exibility versus employment were inves-
tigated by numerous scholars; for a review focusing at European welfare states as de¯ned by
Esping-Andersen (1990) see Esping-Andersen (2000a{b). As concluded by Esping-Andersen
(2000b, p. 99), `the link between labour market regulation and employment is hard to pin
down'. The same empirical evidence, that unemployment is practically independent of the
strictness of employment protection legislation, was reported by the OECD (1999, pp. 47{
132). There were even cases when the same legislation changes caused di®erent e®ects. For
instance, the impact of almost equal deregulation measures on easing restrictions on the use
of ¯xed-term contracts `was sharply di®erent' in Germany and Spain (OECD, 1999, p. 71).
At the same time, a good labour market performance under little regulation was inher-
ent in the `Anglo-Saxon model', that is, USA, Canada, United Kingdom, and Australia
(Esping-Andrsen 2000a). The deregulation of labour market in the Netherlands, which had
a di®erent kind of economy, coincided with the `Dutch miracle' of the 1990ies (Visser and
Hemerijck 1997, Gorter 2000, van Oorschot 2000). A similar Danish practice in the back-
ground of `Eurosclerosis' (Esping-Andersen 2000a, p. 67) was successfull as well (BjÄ orklund
2000, Braun 2001, Madsen 2004). All of these convinced some scholars and politicians in the
harmlessness and even usefulness of labour market deregulation. It was believed that em-
ployment °exibility improved competitiveness of ¯rms and thereby stimulated production,
which in turn animated labour markets.
The claims for °exibilization met a hard resistance, especially in countries with old tra-
ditions of labour movement. Wilthagen and Tros (2004, p. 179) reported with a reference
to Korver (2001) that the Green Paper: Partnership for a New Organisation of Work of the
European Commission (1997) `which promoted the idea of social partnership and balancing
°exibility and security' got a very negative response from French and German trade unions,
because `the idea of partnership represents a threat to the independence of unions and a
10denail of the importance of worker's rights and positions, notably at the enterprise level'.
The ILO published a report, concluding that `the °exibilization of the labour market has led
to a signi¯cant erosion of worker's rights in fundamentally important areas which concern
their employment and income security and (relative) stability of their working and living
conditions' (Ozaki 1999, p. 116).
To handle the growing °exibility of employment relations with lower job security and de-
creasing eligibility to social bene¯ts, the notion of °exicurity has been introduced. Wilthagen
and Tros (2004) ascribe its idea to the member of the Dutch Scienti¯c Council of Govern-
ment Policy Professor Hans Adriaansens and the Dutch Minister of Social A®airs Ad Melkert
(Labour Party). In the autumn of 1995 Adriaansens launched the concept of °exicurity in
speeches and interviews, having de¯ned it as a shift from job security towards employment
security. He suggested to compensate the decreasing job security due to fewer permanent
jobs and easier dismissals by improving the employment opportunities and social security.
For instance, a relaxation of the employment protection legislation was supposed to be
counterbalanced by giving a better status to temporary and part-time workers, life-long
professional training which facilitates changes of jobs, more favorable regulation of working
time, and additional social bene¯ts. In December 1995 Ad Melkert presented a memorandum
Flexibility and Security on a relaxation of the employment protection legislation of permanent
workers provided temporary workers get a regular employment status, without however
adopting the concept of °exicurity as such.
These features were to a great extent already inherent in Denmark with its traditionally
weak employment protection, highly developed social security, and easiness to ¯nd a job
(Madsen 2004). The Denmark social security system met well the idea of °exicurity and
along with that of the Netherlands was recognized a \good-practice example" (Braun 2001,
van Oorschot 2001). Due to these circumstances the Netherlands and Denmark initiated the
international °exicurity debate. Although some authors still consider the °exicurity a speci¯c
Dutch/Danish phenomenon (Gorter 2000), the idea spread all over Europe in a few years;
for a selection of recent international contributions see Jepsen and Klammer (2004). At the
Lisbon summit of 2000 the EU has already referred to this concept (Vielle and Walthery
2003, p. 2; Keller and Seifert 2004, p. 227).
Since the notion is rather new, there is neither established de¯nition of °exicurity, nor
means for its quantitative characterization. This study continues Tangian's (2004) attempt
to ¯ll in this gap and suggests operational de¯nitions of °exicurity which re°ect viewpoints of
liberals and trade unions. For empirical investigation, the corresponding °exicurity indices
are derived from (a) data on the dynamics of employment types, (b) scores of employment
protection legislation provided by the OECD, and (c) qualitative juridical data on social
security. To convert the latter into numbers, eight employment types (permanent full-time,
¯xed-term part-time, etc.) in 16 European countries are ranked with respect to their eligi-
bility to ¯ve social security bene¯ts (unemployment insurance, public pensions, etc).
Ranking is more objective and much easier than numerical estimation but it has some
known shortages like the dependence of one's rank on changes of ranks of competitors (as
in tournaments). To surmount these shortages, the Method of Total Ranks is proposed. It
operates on all instances of all participants at once, so that the dynamics of competitors does
not a®ect the rank of an invariable participant. The ranks replace continuous variables as
index entries, and a dedicated model estimates the total index error which results from such
11an `ordinal rounding' of the index input, comparing to the index based on the non-observable
`exact' continuous variables. In the given application this error does not surpass 3.12%.
The index is calculated for 16 European countries for the years 1994{2003. The results
are not much encouraging. Contrary to theoretical opinions, the current deregulation of
European labour markets is not compensated by improvements in the social security. If
the °exicurity advanages/disadvantages are accounted proportionally to the size of a®ected
groups then the factual trends are negative even from the viewpoint of liberals, to say
nothing of trade unions. The reciprocity of the advantages/disadvantages turns out to be
illusory, because gains are smaller than losses and winners are fewer than losers. Thereby the
study warns against promoting °exicurity policies with no operational control and empirical
feedback.
2 Liberal view at °exicurity
The comprehensive 758-page report on °exicurity (Klammer and Tillmann 2001, p. 16)
de¯nes °exicurity following Wilthagen (2001, p. 1). Three years later Wilthagen and Tros
(2004, p. 169) used the same de¯nition, having replaced the word `coordinated' by the word
`deliberate':
De¯nition 1 (liberal) [Flexicurity is] a policy strategy that attempts, synchronically and
in a deliberate way, to enhance the °exibility of labour markets, work organization and labour
relations on the one hand, and to enhance security | employment security and social security
| notably for weak groups in and outside the labour market on the other hand.
Wilthagen and Tros (2004, p. 170) emphasize that °exicurity is not `simply social pro-
tection for °exible work forces as Klammer and Tillmann (2001), Ferrera et al (2001) and
many others tend to analyze it'. According to Wilthagen and Tros (2004, p. 167), °exicu-
rity policies aim at increasing the competitiveness of European economies by their further
liberalization:
::: The mission of the EU as formulated in Lisbon in 2000 clearly re°ects the
ambition of enhancing both °exibility and security as the aims `to become the
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable
of sustainable economic growth':::
Therefore, `enhancing security' is not the prime goal. It is rather a means to attain a
deliberate compromise (cf. with Wilthagen{Tros' `deliberate') between employers, who seek
for the deregulation of labour markets, and employees, who wish to protect their rights.
It explicitly manifests itself in the description of °exicurity as a °exibility versus security
trade-o®; see Visser and Hemerijck (1997, p. 44) and Wilthagen and Tros (2004, p. 171).
Let us consider this description in some detail.
In a two-commodity space, a trade-o® is an indi®erence curve along which a decrease in
one commodity is compensated by an increase in another commodity. In application to our
consideration such a space is shown in Figure 1. The frontal horizontal axis Strictness of EPL
displays the strictness of employment protection legislation measured in some conditional %.




























The employment protection legislation is understood in a broad sense, concerning not only
dismissals but other aspects of labour market regulation. The strictness grows from left to
right, implying °exibility at the left hand and rigidity at the right hand, so to speak,
Flexibility = 100% ¡ Strictness of EPL :
The second axis Security shows the aggregated employment and social security also measured
in some conditional %. States of the society are depicted by points (vectors) in the two-
dimensional plane Flexibility{Security.
To speak of a trade-o®, one has to assume a preference on the space of states of the
society. A preference is usually represented by a utility function which takes greater values
at more preferable points and remains constant at equivalent points joined into indi®erence
curves (= trade-o®s). The indi®erence curves are but points of the same height on the
utility hill; see Figure 1. A °exicurity policy is imagined as a motion along one of such
indi®erence curves towards a higher °exibility, while the loss in the employment protection
13being compensated by a gain in the social security. In Figure 1 such a policy is depicted by
some hypothetical states of the society in years 1995, 2000, 2005, which are all located in
the same indi®erence curve.
As long as °exibility, security, and social utility are not measurable, the reference to a
trade-o® is just a scienti¯c metaphor. It nevertheless discloses the one-sided intention to
favor employers (motion towards higher °exibility) and not to favor workers (no increment
in social utility), retaining however the social status quo (remaining at the same level of
social utility).
3 Trade-unionist view at °exicurity
From the viewpoint of trade unions, a °exibilization of employment relations can be hardly
compensated by social security bene¯ts, and giving up labour rights for social advantages is
not appropriate. Even if each particular compromise seems more or less fair, their succession
can lead away from the social status quo and the employees can ¯nally get nothing or very
little for their pains. It can run as in the known tale about a man who goes to the market
with a horse, exchanges it for a cow, then the cow for a sheep, and so on unless he ¯nds
himself but with a needle which he looses on the way home.
Since trade unions see little possibilities to compensate °exibilization of employment
relations by social security advantages, the preference of trade unions is determined primarily
by the strictness of EPL, and the second factor, security, is considered ceteris paribus, if
only the ¯rst factor remains invariable. It means that for every given strictness of EPL the
preference grows from 0% to 100%-security level; and every such a run is superior to any
run which starts from a lower strictness level of EPL; see Figure 2. It can be imagined as a
staircase with °oors being EPL strictness levels and each °ight of stairs being the full-range
ascent along the social security scale.
This type of preference is called lexicographic by analogy with a lexicon which words are
ordered alphabetically by the ¯rst letter (here, the strictness of EPL), and those with the
same ¯rst letter are ordered alphabetically by the second letter (the security level), and so
on. The lexicographic preference has no indi®erence curves, because indi®erence levels are
single points. It means that a shortage of a high-priority factor cannot be compensated
by any surplus of lower-priority factors. Finally, no lexicographic preference on a plane
can be represented by a utility function, because the number of `°ights of stairs' is non-
countable as the number of points in the ¯rst axis (Tangian 1991, p. 49{50). To overcome
this representation inconvenience, one can disregard the continuity of the ¯rst scale (here, of
the strictness of EPL) and to calibrate it by reducing to several levels as in Figure 2. Such a
calibrated lexicographic preference is representable by a utility function, but the calibration
levels should be su±ciently dense, otherwise the utility will be little sensible to variations in
the EPL.
The di®erence between viewpoints of liberals and trade unions compels the latter to
promote their own de¯nition of °exicurity. It is just the one criticized by Wilthagen and
Tros (2004, p. 170):
De¯nition 2 (trade-unionist) [Flexicurity is] social protection for °exible work forces as
Klammer and Tillmann (2001), Ferrera et al (2001) and many others tend to analyze it,
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understood as `an alternative to pure °exibilization' (Keller and Seifert 2004, p. 226), and
`to a deregulation-only policy' (Klammer 2004, p. 283); see also WSI (2000).
The interrelation of the liberal and trade-unionist de¯nitions can be illustrated with
Figure 1 by superimposing both preferences. The only common is the `self-evident' Pareto-
preference which stands for bettering one factors with no worsening others. In Figure 1, the
Pareto-bettering domain for the year 2000 is shown by a green rectangle. It contains the
states of the society with more or equally strict EPL and with higher or equal security. The
Pareto-worsening domain with both less strict EPL and lower security is depicted by a red
rectangle.
From the viewpoint of trade unions, there is no much room for a °exicurity policy. In
Figure 1, the corresponding °exicurity trajectory should ascend along the vertical edge of
the Pareto-bettering domain. Deviations towards a lower °exibility (into the domain) are
undesirable for employers, and deviations towards a higher °exibility (out of the domain)
are undesirable for trade unions.
15Thus, the main distinction of the trade-unionist understanding of °exicurity is that it
should protect employees' positions in the globalization-driven processes, as opposed to lib-
eral suggestions to meet employer's requirements under new economical conditions. In other
words, trade-unions consider °exicurity an instrument of labour movement with a reference
to the status-quo, whereas liberals narrow it down to a form of bargaining with relativized
values (Cf. with Wilthagen and Tros' (2004, p. 170) `weaker groups in and outside the labour
market ::: [where] ::: the classi¯cations `stronger' or `weaker' only have a relative meaning
here and cannot be de¯ned in advance').
4 Flexibility versus security
Let us have a closer look at notions Flexibility and Security to better understand which
exchange is proposed. In fact, the Flexibility stands for a multivariate aggregate which,
according to the OECD (1989, p. 13{20), includes:
1. External numerical °exibility (employment °exibility by Standing 1999, p. 101{114;
numerical °exibility by Regini 2000, p. 16, external quantitative °exibility by Vielle and
Walthery 2003, p.8) de¯ned as the employer's ability to adjust the number of employees
to current needs. In other words, it is the easiness of `hiring and ¯ring' which manifests
itself in the mobility of workers between employers (external job turnover).
2. Internal numerical °exibility (work process or functional °exibility by Standing 1999,
p. 114{116; temporal °exibility by Regini 2000, p. 17, internal quantitative °exibility by
Vielle and Walthery 2003, p.8) which is the employer's ability to modify the number
and distribution of working hours with no change of the number of employees. It
appears in shiftworking, seasonal changes in the demand for labour, weekend/holiday
working, overtime and variable hours, see also Keller and Seifert (2004, p. 228).
3. Functional °exibility (job structure °exibility by Standing 1999, p. 117{124; internal-
functional °exibility by Keller and Seifert 2004, p. 228, internal qualitative °exibility by
Vielle and Walthery 2003, p. 8), that is, the employers' ability to move their employees
from one task or department to another, or to change the content of their work. It is
re°ected by the mobility of workers within enterprises (internal labour turnover), see
also Regini (2000, p. 16).
4. Wage °exibility (°exible or variable pay by Wilthagen and Tros 2004, p. 171), which
enables employers to alter wages in response to changing labour market or competitive
conditions. Typically, employers seek for applying individual performance-linked re-
warding systems additionally to (or instead of) usual collective agreements independent
of individual performance, see also Regini (2000, p. 16{17, 19{21).
5. Externalization °exibility (external functional °exibility by Keller and Seifert 2004, p.
228; one of constituents of job structure °exibility by Standing 1999, p. 123; external
qualitative °exibility by Vielle and Walthery 2003, p.8), that is, the employers' ability
to order some works from external workers or ¯rms without employment contracts
but with commercial contracts in such forms as distance working, teleworking, virtual
organizations, and entreployees, that is, self-entrepreneurial activities, see Pongratz
and Vo¼ (2003).
16The notion Security also includes several issues. For instance, Standing (1999, p. 52)
enumerates seven types of security. They are not all relevant to the °exicurity debate,
like labour market security through state-guaranteed full employment in socialist countries.
Within the debate Vielle and Walthery (2003, p. 18{19), following Dupeyroux and Ruellan
(1998), focus the attention at compensatory functions of securities in case of unemployment,
illness, advancing age, maternity, invalidity, as well as exceptional medical or family burdens
(decommodi¯cation in the sense of Esping-Andersen (1990)). More speci¯cally, Wilthagen,
Tros and van Lieshout (2003, p. 4) restrict consideration to the following four types of
security:
1. Job security (employment security by Standing (1999, p. 52)), `the certainty of retaining
a speci¯c job with a speci¯c employer' . It is guaranteed by the protection of employees
against dismissals and against signi¯cant changes of working conditions. This is the
main subject of the employment protection legislation.
2. Employment/employability security (job security by Standing (1999, p. 52)), the `cer-
tainty of remaining at work (not necessarily with the same employer)'. It means the
availability of jobs for dismissed and unemployed, corresponding to their quali¯cation
and previous working conditions. The employability of job seekers can be improved by
life-long professional training which can be o®ered both by employers and by training
programs within active labour market policies; see Keller and Seifert (2004, p. 235).
Trost (2004, p. 5) also mentions organization of ¯rm-¯rm job pools and facilities for
work-work transitions.
3. Income (social) security, the `income protection in the event that paid work ceases'.
Standing considers it more generally as protection of income through minimum wage
machinery, wage indexation, comprehensive social security, including progressive tax-
ation, provisions for old age (post-employment security by Keller and Seifert 2004, p.
236{238), etc.
4. Combination security (not considered by other authors cited), `the certainty of being
able to combine paid work with other social responsibilities and obligations. This last
form of security cannot be traced back to the other forms of security.' Tros (2004, p. 5)
explains it further as a work-life balance, work-family balance, early °exible part-time
retirement, °exible working hours, and leave facilities.
Matrices like in Table 1 are often used to show the compound structure of °exibility
and security and to illustrate the idea of °exicurty trade-o®s. The given example is taken
from Tros' (2004) paper on °exicurity policies for old-aged workers. The cells of the table
show organization measures relevant to the intersecting types of °exibility and security.
Some measures are multi-relevant, like entreployees, that is, supporting self-entrepreneurial
activities.
The matrix in Table 1 gives a clear idea of the composition of both axes Flexibility and
Security and provides a frame to classify organization measures with respect to types of
°exibility and security. However, its aiming at explaining °exicurity trade-o®s is misleading
by two reasons.
17Table 1: The matrix aimed at tracing °exibility versus security trade-o®s with a °exicurity
policy for older workers as given by (Tros 2004) with two bottom rows added
Flexibility types Security types
Job security Employment security Income security Combination security































Structure of policy space and of °exicurity matrix. One reason is that the table
neither separates °exibility and security components in the organization measures adduced,
nor speci¯es the compensation rate of the former by the latter, which is the main content of a
trade-o®. Conversely, the organization measures in the table serve for °exibility and security
simultaneously. This makes them ambiguous (for °exibility, or for security?), conceals the
compensation aspect, and creates an illusion of a `deliberate' solution.
For instance, consider Firm-¯rm job pools at the intersection of row External numerical
°exibility and column Employment security. If it is a °exibility measure to `softly' dismiss
workers (it stands in the row External numerical °exibility!) then the equivalent social
compensation should be speci¯ed. If it is a security measure against easy dismissals (it
stands in the column Employment security!) then it is too weak because it provides poorer
career opportunities than retaining the same job. If it is thought as a measure combining
both °exibility and security in a `deliberate' rate then it is too vague to be taken seriously.
The column Income security is even less clear. What can Retirement arrangements in
the row External numerical °exibility mean? That a dismissed worker will retire? And
additionally will get a pension equivalent to the wage? What can Flexible retirement in the
row Internal numerical °exibility mean? That a non-benevolent part-timer gets a part-time
retirement? In which rate then?
On the other hand, Table 1 provides no space for locating deregulation-only measures or
purely security innovations. For instance, the Dutch Law on Flexibility and Security which
came in force on January 1, 1999 (Wilthagen and Tros 2004, p. 175) consists of a number
of measures, each contributing either to °exibility, or to security. All these real measures
cannot be included in Table 1 just because its cells are linked both to °exibility and security.
18To make the °exicurity matrix consistent with the idea of trade-o®s, the organization
measures in the matrix should meet the way the °exibility trade-o®s are described. Recall
that a °exicurity trade-o® consists of vectors in the plane Flexibility{Security; see Figures
1{2. Organization measures a®ect these vectors, in other words, they operate as increments,
implying that they themselves are vectors in the plane Flexibility{Security.
For instance, each °exibility measure i from the Dutch Law'99 cited should be described
by an EPL decrement, that is, vector (¡xi;0), and every security measure j should be













j yj. Then the e®ect of the Dutch reform'99 is associated with a vector in the pol-
icy space which operates as an increment in the policy'98 vector. If such a quantitative
speci¯cation is di±cult then at least the verbal representation format should be respected:
(a) What the measure, (b) Which contribution to °exibility, and (c) Which contribution to
security.
Dimensionality of policy space and of °exicurity matrix. The second reason why
the matrix in Table 1 is not appropriate for tracing trade-o®s is its insu±cient dimensionality
to contain all the information required.
Usually two matrix dimensions are associated with successive grades of two parameters.
For instance, locating Spain-1999 in the top-right cell of cross-table Unemployment{In°ation
means that in 1999 its in°ation and unemployment were quite high. Then by default Spain-
1999 is associated with a two-dimensional vector (unemployment rate, in°ation rate) located
top-right in the plane Unemployment{In°ation.
Following this standard, vertical and horizontal dimensions of Table 1 are perceived as
Flexibility and Security axes, respectively. Then Job security and Combination security
look as extremities of the Security-axis with intermediate grades Employment security and
Income security which are in fact security components. The same relates to the Flexibiluity
dimension.
In actuality the axes Flexibility and Security fall into ¯ve and four sub-axes, respec-
tively. Consequently, the preferences of both liberals and trade unions are de¯ned on a
nine-dimensional space. Trade-o®s, being hypersurfaces, have one dimension less, but there
still remain eight-dimensions. To represent a trade-o® in a nine-dimensional space, one needs
a nine-dimensional array which dimensions correspond to the nine sub-indices of °exibility
and security. If necessary, the dimensionality of the array can be reduced to the dimension-
ality of the trade-o®, that is, to eight, but not to two. Flexicurity measures, correspondingly,
are described by 9-dimensional vectors ( x1;:::;x5 | {z }
increments
in 5 types of
°exibility
; y1;:::;y4 | {z }
increments
in 4 types of
security
).
Thus, Table 1 provides only the information on (a) what the measure, (b) its simultaneous
relevance to one Flexibility sub-axis, and to one Security sub-axis, that is, which one of ¯ve
Flexibility and one of four Security increments are non-zero. If the measure relates to several
sub-axes, like enterployees, it has several instances in the table. Because of the dimensionality
shortage, neither relevance to a single sub-axis can be re°ected, nor the sign of the increments
can be speci¯ed. Therefore, Table 1 is not adapted to describe Flexibility{Security trade-o®s.
19Double functionality of factors and reduction of the space dimensionality. Let us
see, whether the dimensionality of the °exicurity space is indeed that high, or can be lowered
down. Note that the security factors, except Income (social) security, are the °exibility
factors regarded from the security viewpoint and `securitively' labelled. For instance, Job
security is just the inverse of the External numerical °exibility. It decreases proportionally
to the growth of External numerical °exibility, and vice versa. Therefore, considering Job
security within Security instead of Flexibility means accounting debts for credits. It should
be accounted once, and actually within the increasing Flexibility.
With minor reservations, Employment security is closely interrelated with Internal nu-
merical and Functional °exibility. Variable tasks, training, and using variable hours are
attributes of internal numerical and functional °exibility. Employees are compelled to meet
the increasing requirements of employers under the increasing risk of unemployment. At the
same time, these measures are presented as employment security measures, because with-
out these measures the employer will more likely look for new personnel, which means an
increasing risk of dismissals. Thus, the Employment security in the given form is but the
inverse of two kinds of Flexibility.
The Combination security is a `positively-minded' reformulation of negative consequences
of three types of °exibility (External numerical, Internal numerical, and Externalization).
For instance, enterployees, °exible working hours, part-time work, and early retirement are
all on the °exibility agenda. Having been reformulated as combination security measures,
they look as consolations for non-benevolently self-employed, °exible-hours workers, part-
timers, or early retired. Every cloud has a silver lining.
For the Wage °exibility, there is no security measure even for consolation.
Summing up what has been said, the Security against Flexibility looks thin rather than
full-valued. It has little sense to oppose all types of security to °exibility, because the
latter implies most of the former. With minor reservations, the real room for tracing trade-
o®s contains ¯ve °exibility sub-indices against one security index Income (social) security.
Roughly speaking, the situation is reduced to money compensations to workers who su®er
from °exibilization. It is exactly the axis of bargaining between employers and trade unions
which struggle for guaranteed jobs and stable wages instead of inequivalent social security
bene¯ts.
5 Operationalizing three constituents of °exicurity
Recall how the OECD (1999, p. 49{132) evaluates the impact of employment protection
legislation on labour market performance. At ¯rst the strictness of EPL is quantitatively
estimated for 27 countries which scores (so the EPL-index is called) range from 0 to 6. These
27 scores are regarded manifestations of the independent variable Strictness of EPL. Then
the national unemployment rates are assumed dependent on the EPL, and a regression line
is ¯tted to the observations. Similarly, other employment indicators (youth unemployment,
share of temporal unemployment, etc.) are represented as linear functions of the strictness
of EPL.
This approach is noteworthy in three respects. First, it shows how to empirically study
qualitative phenomena by designing appropriate indices. Second, the estimation of strictness
20of EPL provides an instructive example of de¯ning a numerical index from juridical data.
Third, the index Strictness of EPL is ready to use in our application.
Convention on indices of °exibility and security. In our study, we restrict attention
to two main indices, Strictness of EPL and Social (income) security. As for the former,
recall that the °exicurity debate originates from claims to relax the EPL which constrains
the external numerical °exibility. Consequently, the Strictness of EPL can be regarded an
indicator of the External numerical °exibility which plays the key role in the debate. As for
the latter, its prime importance is explained in the previous section. Constructing the full
nine-dimensional space `¯ve °exibilities versus four securities', and aggregating ¯ve °exibility
and four security indicators into two principal axes as in Figures 1{2 is postponed to the
next paper.
Utility of trade unions. The third structural constituent of °exicurity, Social utility,
often remains in the shade. It operates `behind the scene' but nevertheless determines
°exicurity goals, di®erence in bargaining values, and policy strategies either as trade-o®s,
or as Pareto-bettering. It embodies the General Will in the sense of J.-J.Rousseau (1762)
and activates the interaction between otherwise passive descriptive factors of °exibility and
security. This constituent is explicitly represented in Figures 1{2 by the third (vertical)
dimension and by projections of the indi®erence levels of the utility hill onto the plane
Flexibility{Security.
The utility of trade unions is constructed in two steps. At the ¯rst step, the indices
of °exibility and security are aggregated. At the second step, the lexicographic order is
applied to the two aggregates. Consequently, constructing the utility of trade unions requires
constructing the indices of °exibility and security, and then the lexicographic ordering follows
`automatically'. Since in our study the °exibility is represented by the Strictness of EPL
available from the OECD, and the security bundle is represented by the index of Social
security, it remains to construct the latter.
Utility of liberals. Unlike the utility of trade unions, the liberals' utility is de¯ned di-
rectly on the nine-dimensional space of °exibility types and of security types. Although
its construction has only one step, it is a complex task with a great deal of subjectivity.
Alternatively, one can ¯rst aggregate the °exibility and security indices and then order them
by some preference on the plane Flexibility{Security.
In the given study we deal with one °exibility and one security factor. Under no infor-
mation, their statistically most likely ratio is 1:1 provided the factors have equal range; see
Section 7 for methodological details. Therefore the liberal's utility is assumed to be the sum
of Strictness of EPL and Social security, both being reduced to the standard scale 0%{100%.
Such a utility can be certainly doubted, because it actually depends on how the two indices
are evaluated, how the values are distributed within the range, and what they practically
mean. Since this information is unavailable (even if it were could it be su±ciently reliable?),
the assumption on the liberal utility is just the least of all evils.
It should be emphasized that these doubts would arise for any °exibility-to-security
weight ratio. They result from the liberal concept of °exicurity itself which includes trade-
o®s with subjective (`deliberate') rates of substitution. This di±culty is however not crucial
21for our study aimed primarily at developing the model's general framework rather than at
adjusting its parameters by experts.
6 Index of °exibility
As explained previously, the Flexibility is characterized by the OECD's index Strictness
of EPL given in Table 2 for permanently and ¯xed-term employed. For the index of Se-
curity such a classi¯cation is insu±cient, because the eligibility to social security bene¯ts
depends also on other employment indicators. Let us introduce a universal classi¯cation of
employment types for both indices Flexibility and Security.
Klammer and Tillmann (2001c, p. 514) and Ho®mann and Walwei (2000) classify °ex-
ibly employed with respect to four dichotomic indicators: (a) permanent/¯xed-term, (b)
full-time/part-time, (c) employed/self-employed, and (d) in agriculture/not in agriculture.
For self-employed the indicator permanent/¯xed-term is not relevant, and from 24 = 16
employment groups it remains the following eight:
1. Permanently full-time employed
2. Permanently part-time employed
3. Fixed-term full-time employed
4. Fixed-term part-time employed1
5. Full-time self-employed in agriculture
6. Full-time self-employed not in agriculture
7. Part-time self-employed in agriculture
8. Part-time self-employed not in agriculture.
To obtain the Strictness of EPL for these groups for control years 1990{2003 do the
following.
² Attribute the scores for late 1980s to 1989 and the scores for late 1990s to 1999.
² Assume constant the score of Collective dismissals which is given only for late 1990s.
² Compute the Strictness of EPL for employment group 1{8 for 1989 and 1999 by the
formula with the weight coe±cients suggested by the OECD (1999, p. 118):





6 ¢ Score of the group
+1
6 ¢ Collective dismissals for employed (groups 1{4)
0 for self-employed (groups 5{8)
:
1Fixed-term part-timers with low income are sometimes singled out into the group of Mini-job-holders;
see Keller and Seifert (2004, p. 240). We do not consider mini-jobs here, because they are ill-socially-secured,
not su±ciently re°ected in the available statistics, and because it is impossible to consider all minor forms
of employment relations. One has to stop somewhere, not descending to tips for hotel porters. The natural
criterion of signi¯cant jobs is the tax liability which cuts mini-jobs o®.
22Table 2: Summary indicators of the strictness of employment protection legislation. Source:
own estimation based on OECD (1999) pp. 52{53, 66
Permanent employment Fixed-term employment Collective dismissals
Late 1980s Late 1990s Late 1980s Late 1990s Late 1990s
Score 0{6 Score 0{6 Score 0{6 Score 0{6 Score 0{6
Germany 2:7 2:8 3:8 2:3 3:1
Austria 2:6 2:6 1:8 1:8 3:3
Belgium 1:5 1:5 4:6 2:8 4:1
Switzerland 1:2 1:2 0:9 0:9 3:9
Czech Republic 2:8 2:8 0:5 0:5 4:3
Danemark 1:6 1:6 2:6 0:9 3:1
Spain 3:9 2:6 3:5 3:5 3:1
Finland 2:7 2:1 1:9 1:9 2:4
France 2:3 2:3 3:1 3:6 2:1
Italy 2:8 2:8 5:4 3:8 4:1
Netherlands 3:1 3:1 2:4 1:2 2:8
Norway 2:4 2:4 3:5 2:8 2:8
Poland 2:2 2:2 1:0 1:0 3:9
Portugal 4:8 4:3 3:4 3:0 3:6
Sweden 2:8 2:8 4:1 1:6 4:5
United Kingdom 0:8 0:8 0:3 0:3 2:9
² Obtain the EPL-scores for 1990{2003 by linear regression. Thereby each triplet em-
ployment group/country/year (= employment group in a country in a year) gets its
own score.
² Normalize the scores to the range 0{100%. Thereby 0% and 100% are assigned to the
triplets employment group/country/year with the lowest, respectively, highest index
attained within the control period 1990{2003.
The results for Germany are shown in Table 3 coupled with Figure 3. The top number of
each cell is the size of the group in % to total employment. In Figure 3 it is the length of the
corresponding color rectangle. The bottom number of the cell is the Strictness of EPL for
the group shown by the color rectangle's height. The black background is the EPL-de¯cit,
that is, the remainder to attain the 100%-strictness of EPL.
The factual rather than intended job security in a country can be described by the av-
erage Strictness of EPL weighted proportionally to the size of the employment groups. For
example, if a strongly protected group is small and a weakly protected group is large then
the factual job security is low. Such a weighted average is shown in the next to last column
of Table 3. In Figure 3 it is the share of colored area in the framing rectangle of the year.
The last column of Table 3 contains a similar index but for °exibly employed only. In
Figure 3 it is the share of colored area in the reduced framing rectangle of the year with
no ¯rst (permanent full-time) section. The reference to all or only to °exibly employed is
necessary to distinguish between the liberal and trade-unionist concepts of °exicurity.
The auxiliary graph in Figure 3 visualizes the Strictness of EPL yearly dynamics for
normally, for all, and for °exibly employed (the ¯rst and two last columns of Table 3).
23Table 3: Employment types in Germany and their evaluation with respect to criterion Strict-
ness of EPL (Source: EuroStat and own estimation)
Year Employment group, in % to total employment / Strictness of EPL
Its summary score with respect to criterion Strictness of EPL, in % (weighted average




































































































































































































































































































24Figure 3: Employment types in Germany and their evaluation with respect to criterion



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































257 The OECD methodology and rank-based indices
Recall that the OECD's EPL-index is based on 20 ¯rst-level indicators which are estimated
cardinally (= numerically) by the authors of the study. Then these indicators are aggregated
through a four-level hierarchy of taking weighted sums; see OECD (1999, p. 115{118) and
Grubb and Wells (1993). The OECD itself acknowledges that `the scoring algorithm is
somewhat arbitrary' (Op. cit., p. 115). Indeed, the overcomplicated hierarchical summation,
unexplained weight assignments, and subjective cardinal evaluation of ¯rst-level indicators
are little substantiated.
The situation is however not that bad. First of all note that a hierarchy of weighted sums
of ¯rst-level indicators is mathematically equivalent to a one-level sum of the indicators with
appropriately adjusted weights. In turn, a weighted sum of input variables can be always
regarded the ¯rst-order approximation of an index de¯ned in a most general functional form,
which is explained in the remark below.
Remark 1 (Why indices are weighted sums of variables)
An index is a formula with n entries, in other words, a function f in n variables which to each
set of input values x1;:::;xn puts into correspondence the index value y = f(x1;:::;xn).
Usually an index is not expected to abruptly change its behavior, meaning the di®erentiability
of f. Then its Taylor expansion in a neighborhood of some reference point (x0
1;:::;x0
n) gives
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Since indices are primarily designed to show relative changes, the constant C in (1) is omitted.
The remaining weighted sum of variables is, consequently, the index to within its ¯rst-order
approximation.
Consequently, the hierarchical organization of the OECD's EPL-index is logically consis-
tent, and the ¯rst problem is resolved.
Next, the weight assignments made by the OECD would be doubtful only if the summary
scores were questionable. The OECD EPL-index implicitly incorporates the OECD's expert
knowledge, and it is not surprising that the summary scores look adequate, implying that
the weight coe±cients are also trustworthy. It does not matter, whether they were ¯xed a
priory, or ¯tted to the intended summary scores suggested by experts. However, a direct
estimation of the EPL-scores might have the advantage of being less obscure.
The last and the most critical point is the direct cardinal estimation of the ¯rst-level
indicators which can be hardly considered reliable. The OECD mentions the alternative
26possibility of using rank-based methods which are generally regarded more objective. Nev-
ertheless, the OECD (1999, p. 115) argues for the cardinal estimation:
One limitation of a summary indicator based on ranking is that a given country's
strictness score could either rise or fall over time, even though its employment
protection practice were completely unchanged, for the simple reason that other
countries changed their policies. Even more fundamentally, it would be invalid to
compare rank-based score for the late 1980s, which was based on an analysis of 16
European countries, with a rank-based score for the late 1990s based on a sample
of 27 countries. Quite independently of any changes in EPL, the maximum rank
score has nearly doubled.
The ¯rst anxiety here is that rank-based indices can make a country's score dependent
on changes in other countries. It is similar to what occurs in tournaments when one's rating
is altered by wins/losses of competitors. This phenomenon, known in the theory of choice as
the dependence of irrelevant alternatives, is not always critical; for the historical discussion
see Black (1958, pp. 156{238) and McLean and Urken (1994, Introduction). In case of
labour laws, changes are seldom and not revolutionary, so country ranks do not change
radically. Besides, the very idea of strictness of EPL has only a relative meaning, especially
in a comparative study. For instance, if one country stagnates in the background of general
progress, it is not wrong to interpret the being out of date as a relative degradation. Finally,
the ranking method itself can be adapted as follows.
Remark 2 (Method of Total Ranks)
To be speci¯c, consider Denmark (DK) and Netherlands (NL) with regard to the duration
of unemployment insurance in 1994{2004. In 1994 the duration of Danish insurance was
30 months, and in the Netherlands it was 6{54 months, depending on the length of service
and age (Schmid and Reissert 1996, p. 239{241). In 2004 Denmark extended the duration
unconditionally to 48 months (European Commission 2004). Although the duration of Dutch
insurance remained unchanged, the Netherlands fall in the two successive rankings:
Rank 1994 2004
Country Insurance duration Country Insurance duration
1 NL 6{54 months, conditioned DK 48 months, unconditioned
2 DK 30 months, unconditioned NL 6{54 months, conditioned
Now rank all the pairs Country/Year. For this purpose consider Denmark in 1994 and
Denmark in 2004 as two di®erent objects (as they actually are) and the Netherlands in 1994
and in 2004 as two copies of the same object. Hence, the total ranking is
Rank Country Year Insurance duration
1 DK 2004 48 months, unconditioned
2 NL 1994 6{54 months, conditioned
2 NL 2004 6{54 months, conditioned
3 DK 1994 30 months, unconditioned
which implies the constant rank of the Netherlands and changing ranks of Denmark:
27Rank 1994 2004
Country Insurance duration Country Insurance duration
1 DK 48 months, unconditioned
2 NL 6{54 months, conditioned NL 6{54 months, conditioned
3 DK 30 months, unconditioned
Thus ranks can be made independent of `irrelevant alternatives'.
The second `more fundamental' anxiety of the OECD is that the ¯rst-level indicators
based on ranks are invalid when the number of countries changes (e.g. the top rank of 27
countries almost doubles the top rank of 16 countries). This problem can be resolved by
proportionally reducing all the ranks to the standard scale 0{1. The rigorous normalizing
rules as well as the estimation of error from substituting ordinal ranks for cardinal scores
are given in the following remark.
Remark 3 (Accuracy of an index based on normalized ranks)
Options are often hard to evaluate numerically but easy to rank with respect to partial
criteria. The ranks can be regarded manifestations of continuous evaluations which are not
observed directly. Consequently, if one de¯nes an index as a weighted sum of partial scores
and disposes but partial ranks, it is natural to substitute the ranks for the scores.
This idea goes back to the justi¯cation of Borda's (1733{1799) method of marks by
Laplace (1749{1827); for the modern account see Black (1958), Tangian (1991), and McLane
and Urken (1994). Recall that Borda proposed to evaluate candidates to the members of
the Royal Academy of Sciences in Paris by the sum of their ranks in the ballot schedules.
Laplace assumed that these ranks were manifestations of some n latent metrical estimates
(scores) uniformly distributed in the segment [0;1]. He showed that the ratio of expectations
of the scores was as that of their ranks
¹1 : ¹2 : ::: : ¹n = 1 : 2 : ::: : n :
By the Central Limit Theorem (the ¯rst version is attributed to Moivre (1667{1754); see
Kendall and Stuart 1958, Korn and Korn 1968) a sum of a large number of metrical scores
is well approximated by the sum of their expectations, or ranks. Laplace concluded that in
a large statistical model scores could be replaced by ranks with a negligible error.
This way of thought can be implemented already for a few metrical estimates (scores)
under a controllable accuracy of approximation. The next theorem suggests a normalizing
rule for the input ranks and estimates the index errors which result from `ordinal rounding'
of continuous index entries.
Theorem 1 (Accuracy of an index based on normalized ranks)
Let given options be independently ranked with respect to partial criteria k = 1;:::;K,
each time falling into Rk ranking classes, depending on the criterion k. For each criterion,
the ranks are ordinal manifestations of unknown continuous scores x1;:::;xRk which are
random variables uniformly distributed in the segment [0;1] (in statistics, if a distribution is
not known it is assumed uniform by default). Consider an index (weighted sum of variables













ak = 1; ak ¸ 0 ; (2)
28where xrk is the rkth score from the bottom in the set of the kth criterion's scores. Then the
`rounding error' ¢ = I ¡ ~ I has the expectation and the variance, respectively,
¹ = E¢ = 0
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Proof. Fix the kth criterion. As shown by Kendall and Moran (1963), the rkth ordered
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(Rk + 1)2(Rk + 2)
:
Hence, taking into account that I is constant regardless of values xrk









akEsrk = 0 :
By the independence of estimation with respect to di®erent criteria, the variance of the sum
of scores is equal to the sum of their variances. We obtain
¾
2 = V¢ = VI |{z}
=0 since I is constant






rk(Rk ¡ rk + 1)
(Rk + 1)2(Rk + 2)
;
as required.
As estimated below by formula (3), the rank-based °exicurity index (Flexibility + Secu-
rity)/2 does not deviate from the unknown `true' cardinal-input index by more than 3.12%.
Such a deviation is likely smaller than the error from an uncontrollable cardinal estimation
multiplied by the complexity of aggregation hierarchy used by the OECD.
We conclude that the OECD's anxieties about the rigor of its EPL-index, as well as about
using ranks in indices are overemphasized. The hierarchical weighted summation of ¯rst-level
indicators and using ranks instead of their cardinal estimates are absolutely acceptable. The
minor shortages of rank-based indices are by far compensated by their objectivity, accuracy,
and transparency. It means that the OECD approach can be appropriately modi¯ed to
satisfy most fastidious critics.
8 Index of security
As mentioned in Section 4, the main function of social security is to compensate income
losses in case of unemployment, illness, etc. We consider the following ¯ve bene¯ts:
1. Unemployment insurance (OECD 2002, p. 144{150)
2. Participation in a public pension scheme (OECD 2002, p. 144{150)
293. Paid sick leave (OECD 2002, p. 144{150)
4. Paid maternity leave (OECD 2002, p. 144{150)
5. Paid holidays (OECD 2002, p. 144{150)2
Let us explain the construction of the ¯rst security indicator, Unemployment insurance,
step-by-step. The national eligibility conditions are listed in the ¯rst section of Table 4. The
juridical data are taken from OECD (2002, p. 146{148) and updated from the data base of
European Commission (2004) by Martin Kimmich. Having compared these data with the
data on unemployment insurance in Europe in 1994 compiled by Schmid and Reissert (1996,
pp. 239{241), Judith Aust found no signi¯cant changes during 1994{2003. Some changes
occurred in Denmark, France, Italy, Sweden in 2004, that is, outside the control period.
Since data on dynamics of social regulation were not available, the scores were assumed
constant over the whole period 1994{2003 (standard default assumption used in statistics in
such cases).
The second section of Table 4 contains ordinal evaluations (also by Martin Kimmuch)
of all the 8 employment groups in 16 countries, totally 128 options. Di®erent employment
groups of the same country meet the national eligibility conditions di®erently, implying
di®erent degree of advantageousness re°ected in the evaluation.
Start from rank 1, assigning it to the best pair(s) Group/Country with respect to the
given criterion. Then attribute rank 2 to the next-best group(s), and so on. It can happen
that certain options have been overlooked and should be inserted between the ones already
ranked. Not to rearrange all, they are given an intermediate fractional rank, say, 1.5. These
fractional ranks are converted to actual integer-valued ranks (in parentheses) by computer.
NAN (Not A Number) stands for missed data. As traditional in empirical studies, missing
data are replaced by mean values, in this case by the rounded middle rank. Since there
are 12 rank degrees (= maximal rank R1; speci¯ed in the caption to the table), the NaN is
ranked 6.5 (ranks start from 1!) rounded to 7.
The (partial) ranks rk with respect to partial criteria Pensions, Sick leave, Maternity leave,
and Paid holidays are obtained in the same way. For every of the 128 Group/Country's,
the summary rank r is derived from its ¯ve partial ranks by formula (2) with equal weight
coe±cients ak = 1
5 (if the relative importance of partial security criteria is not speci¯ed then
equal weights are statistically most likely) which also reduces r to the standard scale 0{1.
To meet the rule `the more the better' convert the summary rank into the summary score
by the rule (1 ¡ r) ¢ 100%.
For example, the group of permanently full-time employed in Germany has partial ranks
with respect to the ¯ve partial criteria rk = 5;4;1;1;4; see Tables 4{7. The corresponding
maximal ranks are Rk = 12;9;15;8;7; see captions to Tables 4{7. Substituting these values
into (2), obtain the summary rank 0:292 and the summary score (1¡0:292)¢100% = 70:2%,
which is the bottom-left element of Table 9. Partial ranks rk can be individually reduced
to the scale 0{1, as done in (2), and converted into partial scores (1 ¡
rk
Rk+1) ¢ 100% which
show the contribution of each partial criterion to the summary score. The composition of
2Entitlement to paid holidays is usually not considered within the °exicurity debate. It is not quite
logical. Securities are aimed at compensating income losses and exceptional medical and family burdens,
including vacations. Therefore, no entitlement to paid holidays discriminates those °exibly employed who
work few hours, under short-time contracts, or self-employed, which should be taken into account.
30summary scores from partial scores for the sample year 2003 is displayed in the foot section
of Table 9.
The summary scores for eight German employment groups as well as their yearly weighted
totals (= Security index) are displayed in Table 9 coupled with Figure 4 analogous to Table 3{
Figure 3 for Flexibility. The di®erence is that each summary Security-score is composed of
¯ve partial scores shown in Figure 4 by color layers.
9 Charts of liberal and trade-unionist °exicurity
After the time series for both country indices Strictness of EPL and Security have been
constructed, one can draw dynamical trajectories of the 16 countries in the plane Flexibility{
Security.
Chart of liberal °exicurity. The time series for both indices Strictness of EPL and Secu-
rity, as well as for the liberal °exicurity utility function u =(Strictness of EPL+Security)/2
for 16 European countries are displayed in Table 10 coupled with Figure 5, where the third
dimension, the height of the utility hill, is shown by diagonal isolines. The last column of
Table 10 provides ranks of the countries at the end of the control period (2003) with respect
to each indicator and with respect to the utility function.
The °exicure countries with a high °exibility and a high security are located in the
top-left corner (Denmark and Finland). The in°exicure countries with a low °exibility (=
high Strictness of EPL) and a high index of Security are located in the top-right corner
of the chart (Sweden and the Netherlands). The only outlier in the left-bottom corner
with high °exibility and low social security indicator is the °ex-insecure United Kingdom.
The bottom-right corner is occupied by in°ex-insecure countries with a strict employment
protection legislation and relatively little advanced social security (Spain, Portugal, and
Czech Republic).
The most striking feature of the °exicurity chart is that, with the only exceptions for
Denmark in the 1990s and the Netherlands in the late 1990s, no country evolves in the
top-left °exicurity direction, but clearly degrades in both indicators towards °ex-insecurity.
Indeed, the dynamical trajectories of the countries, instead of going parallel to the utility
isolines (= °exicurity trade-o®s), cross them obliquely or even orthogonal. This means a
factual violation of the °exicurity concept, contrary to political promises and theoretical
declarations.
The problem here is not that the given liberal utility function u =(Strictness of EPL
+ Security)/2 is selected erroneously and its weight coe±cients are inappropriate. In fact,
no adjustment of utility function can help, because most country trajectories are directed
towards the Pareto-worsening domain (the bottom-left quadrant with respect to a given
point) which are common to all liberal utility functions3. Hence, whatever the liberal utility
function is, the degradation is still persistent. One can conclude that deregulation prevails
3The very idea to compensate °exibilization by social security prompts that advancing in °exibilization
is bad and advancing in security is good. This means that every liberal utility function increases in both
axes Strictness of EPL and Security. Consequently, under every liberal utility function the Pareto-worsening




























































































































































































2(5) 2(5) 2.5(6) 2.5(6) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12)





2(5) 2.5(6) 3(8) 3(8) 6(12) 2(5) 6(12) 2.5(6)








3(8) 4(10) 3(8) 4(10) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12)





1.5(3) 1.5(3) 1.75(4) 1.75(4) NaN(7) NaN(7) NaN(7) NaN(7)
Czech Republic yes 12 months in
past 3 years







2(5) 2(5) 2.75(7) 2.75(7) 2.5(6) 2.5(6) 2.5(6) 2.5(6)
Spain yes 360 days in
past 6 years
2(5) 2(5) 2.5(6) 2.5(6) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12)








































































































































































































France yes 4 months in
past 18
months
1(1) 1(1) 1.25(2) 1.25(2) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12)
Italy yes 52 weeks in
past 2 years
2(5) 2(5) 3(8) 3(8) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12)
Netherlands yes 26 weeks in
last
39 weeks
1.5(3) 1.5(3) 1.75(4) 1.75(4) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12)

















2(5) 3.5(9) 3(8) 3.5(9) NaN(7) NaN(7) NaN(7) NaN(7)
Portugal yes 540 days in
past 24
months
3.5(9) 4.5(11) 4.5(11) 4.5(11) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12)
Sweden yes 6 months in
past 12
months
1.5(3) 1.5(3) 1.5(3) 1.5(3) 2.5(6) 2.5(6) 2.5(6) 2.5(6)









3(8) 3.5(9) 3(8) 3.5(9) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12)
3
3Table 5: Ranking (1{9) groups of employees with respect to social security bene¯t Pension.
Source: own estimation based on OECD (2002), p. 146{148 and MISSOC (2004)


























































3(5) 3.5(6) 3(5) 3.5(6) 3(5) 3(5) 3.5(6) 3.5(6)
Belgium yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2)
Switzerland yes 1 year 2(3) 2(3) 2.5(4) 2.5(4) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5)
Czech Republic yes not ap-
plicable
NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5)
Danemark yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1)
Spain yes 15 years 3(5) 3(5) 4(7) 4(7) 3(5) 3(5) 3(5) 3(5)





1(1) 2(3) 1(1) 2(3) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 2(3) 2(3)
France yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 2(3) 2(3) 2(3) 2(3)
Italy yes 5 years 2.5(4) 3(5) 3.5(6) 3.5(6) 2.5(4) 2.5(4) 3(5) 3(5)
Netherlands yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1)
Norway yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1)
Poland yes it varies NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5)




3(5) 5(9) 4(7) 5(9) 3(5) 3(5) 5(9) 5(9)
Sweden yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1)




2(3) 2.5(4) 2(3) 2.5(4) 2(3) 2(3) 2.5(4) 2.5(4)
34Table 6: Ranking (1{15) groups of employees with respect to social security bene¯t Sick
leave. Source: own estimation based on OECD (2002), p. 146{148 and MISSOC (2004)
























































1.5(2) 3.5(9) 1.5(2) 3.5(9) 6(15) 3.5(9) 6(15) 3.5(9)
Belgium yes 3
months







2(4) 2(4) 2.5(5) 2.5(5) NaN(8) NaN(8) NaN(8) NaN(8)
Czech Republic no not ap-
plicable
6(15) 6(15) 6(15) 6(15) NaN(8) NaN(8) NaN(8) NaN(8)




1(1) 3.5(9) 1(1) 3.5(9) 3.75(10) 3.75(10) 3.75(10) 3.75(10)
Spain yes 180 days
in past
5 years
4(11) 4.5(13) 5(14) 5(14) 4(11) 4(11) 4.5(13) 4.5(13)





3(7) 4(11) 3.5(9) 4(11) 6(15) 5(14) 6(15) 5(14)
Italy yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 6(15) 6(15) 6(15) 6(15)
Netherlands yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 6(15) 6(15) 6(15) 6(15)
Norway yes 14 days 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 2(4) 2(4) 2(4) 2(4)
Poland yes 30 days 1.75(3) 1.75(3) 1.75(3) 1.75(3) NaN(8) NaN(8) NaN(8) NaN(8)
Portugal yes 6
months
3.5(9) 3.5(9) 3.75(10) 3.75(10) 4(11) 4(11) 4.25(12) 4.25(12)
Sweden yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2)




































































































































































































yes 1(1) 3(4) 1(1) 3(4) 5.5(7) 3(4) 5.5(7) 3(4)
Belgium yes all yes (at
bene¯t
level)
1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 3(4) 3(4) 3(4) 3(4)
Switzerland yes all yes 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5)
Czech Republic no not
applicable
yes 6(8) 6(8) 6(8) 6(8) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5)




yes 1.5(2) 3(4) 1.5(2) 3(4) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2)
Spain yes 180 days in
past 5 years
no 3(4) 3.5(5) 3.5(5) 3.5(5) 3(4) 3(4) 3.5(5) 3.5(5)
Finland yes all yes (by the
state)
1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1)






yes 1.75(3) 3(4) 3(4) 3(4) 1(1) NaN(5) 1(1) NaN(5)
Italy yes all no 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2)
Netherlands yes all no 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1)
Norway yes all yes 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1)
Poland yes 6 months no 3(4) 3(4) 3.5(5) 3.5(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5)
Portugal yes 6 months yes 3(4) 3(4) 3.5(5) 3.5(5) 6(8) 6(8) 6(8) 6(8)
Sweden yes all yes 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1)




yes 3(4) 4(6) 3.5(5) 4(6) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1)
3
6Table 8: Ranking (1{7) groups of employees with respect to social security bene¯t Paid
holidays. Source: own estimation based on OECD (2002), p. 146{148 and MISSOC (2004)

















































3(4) 3(4) 3(4) 3(4) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Austria yes 6
months
3(4) 3(4) 3(4) 3(4) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Belgium yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Switzerland yes pro rata 2(3) 3(4) 2(3) 3(4) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Czech Republic yes NaN(4) NaN(4) NaN(4) NaN(4) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Danemark yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Spain yes NaN(4) NaN(4) NaN(4) NaN(4) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)






1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
France yes 1 month 2(3) 2(3) 2(3) 2(3) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Italy yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Netherlands yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Norway yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Poland yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Portugal yes 30 days 2(3) 2(3) 2(3) 2(3) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
















4(5) 4(5) 4(5) 4(5) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
37Table 9: Employment types in Germany and their evaluation with respect to criterion Se-
curity (Source: EuroStat and own estimation)
Year Employment group, in % to total employment / Security
Its summary score with respect to criterion Security, in % (weighted average




































































































































































































































































































Construction of summary score Security from partial scores for 2003, in % Criterion weight
Unempl.insur. 61.5 61.5 53.8 53.8 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 0.2
Pension 60.0 50.0 40.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 20.0 50.0 0.2
Sick leave 93.8 93.8 93.8 93.8 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 0.2
Matern.leave 88.9 88.9 88.9 88.9 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 0.2
Paid holidays 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 0.2
Weighted sum 70.8 68.8 65.3 65.3 17.5 19.5 11.5 17.5 1.0
38Figure 4: Employment types in Germany and their evaluation with respect to criterion






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































39unambiguously, whereas much promoted °exicurity policies are practically invisible.
No increase in the Security index is observed in all the countries with the only exception
for the Netherlands in the late 1990s. It does not necessarily imply that there are no
improvements in national social security systems all over Europe. The explanation is that
an increase in °exible employment disquali¯es more workers from social bene¯ts. Let us
comment on it in some detail.
Recall that the indices Flexibility and Security are weighted, re°ecting the average factual
situation in the country. If a °exibilization lowers down the employment status on the average
then, also on the average, it disquali¯es workers from social security bene¯ts and thereby
lowers down the factual security. Consequently, even a developing social security system
can fail in increasing the Security index if the °exibilization is followed with a delay and if
eligibility conditions are ¯tted to outdated norms.
The impact of °exibilization on the factual state of security can be most clearly observed
in Germany, where a relaxation of employment protection legislation caused since 1991 a
reduction of the share of normal employment from 71% to 62%; see the top ¯gures for 1991
and 2003 in the ¯rst column of Table 9 and the narrowing ¯rst (blue) rectangles in Figure 4.
Since fewer employed got quali¯ed for high security bene¯ts, the factual security lowered
down by 1%; see the ¯gures for 1991 and 2003 in the next to last column of Table 9 and
the falling middle curve in Figure 4. Thus an increase in Flexibility was aggravated by an
implicit decrease in Security, according to the principle `who does not swim drowns'. (A
similar relaxation of EPL in Spain did not cause structural changes in employment as in
Germany, because the share of normally employed in Spain was already as low as 50% and
did not decrease further.)
Some countries develop their social security systems but manage only to `keep standing at
the place' against the counter-°ow of °exibilization. For instance, the share of °exibly em-
ployed in Portugal decreased since 1992 from 65% to 56%, but the Security index remained
unchanged. Thus, security measures intended to compensate a growing °exibilization can
su±ce only to retain the existing security level but not to pursue a °exicurity policy. To be
a real balance weight for °exibilization, the security system must be itself °ex-
ible and double-generous with increasing compensatory capacities and relaxing
eligibility conditions.
Chart of trade-unionist °exicurity. According to the trade-unionist concept of °exi-
curity, the focus should be made at improving the employment and social security of °exible
workers without giving up the rights of regular workers. As follows from the previous anal-
ysis, it is not the case, and we could immediately stop here. Nevertheless, let us have a look
what happens at the market of °exible labour forces, abstracting from its interactions with
the market of regular employment.
Under this abstraction consider Table 11 coupled with Figure 6. The vertical indi®er-
ence isolines in the latter re°ect the ¯rst-priority values in the trade-unionist lexicographic
preference. They show the principal role of labour rights (EPL tightens in the right hand di-
rection, orthogonal to indi®erence isolines). Comparing to the key questions of employment
protection, security questions with corresponding up-downward displacements are regarded
secondary. Therefore, any policy trajectory with a shift to the left is unfavorable for trade
unions, regardless of vertical increment. An upward increment is of interest if only the
40horizontal increment is negligible, otherwise it can be ignored as unimportant.
There are clear manifestations of °exicurity policies during the control period 1994{2003.
As follows from Table 11 (for °exibly employed only!), the decisive indicator Strictness of
EPL increased in France (29:6 % 39:4%), Italy (15:9 % 21:0%), Spain (36:0 % 40:9%),
Austria (29:3 % 34:0%), Poland (10:0 % 14:3%), and Belgium (24:2 % 26:2%). The general
security of °exible employed has improved in some of these countries as well, like Italy
(39:8 % 45:9%), Belgium (54:7 % 61:0%), France (51:5 % 55:7%), Poland (45:7 % 49:1%),
and Austria (45:2 % 47:1%). The progress in Poland is especially remarkable, because it
occurred within only four years 2000{2003 of availability of Poland's statistical data to the
EU.
However, in many cases this increase is not due to a better employment and social protec-
tion of °exibly employed. To a great extent it is due to the increasing share of permanently
part-time employed. For instance, more and more young people and women entering the
labour market sign part-time contracts, thereby reducing the share of normal employment
(Austria, France, Belgium, Poland). Another factor is the decreasing share of self-employed
since they close their business and become employees (France, Austria, Belgium). Thereby
the share of better employment/socially protected within °exibly employed increases and
their average employment and social security status grows. This is just re°ected by the
indices.
The greatest degression in social utility due to a decrease in the decisive indicator Strict-
ness of EPL (again, we speak exclusively of °exibly employed!) is inherent in Sweden
(42:8 & 31:6%), Denmark (31:0 & 21:9%), Germany (43:1 & 36:9%), Czech Republic
(15:6 & 11:7%), the Netherlands (42:9 & 40:5%), and Portugal (25:4 & 24:9%). As for
compensation of these degradations by security measures, there is no sense to discuss it as
long as the trade-unionist lexicographic utility is considered.
The degressions are often caused also by °exibilization-driven transitions between em-
ployment categories rather than by institutional changes. For instance, in Sweden the share
of best-protected permanently part-time employed decreased from 18.3 to 14.1% (to to-
tal employment), and in Denmark from 19.5 to 17.3%. In Czech Republic the share of
well-protected permanent part-timers in total employment decreased not that signi¯cantly
(3:1 & 2:3%) but the share of self-employed, who are not protected by labour laws at all,
increased (10:7 % 15:3%). That means that the average employment status within °exibly
employed lowered down and the average employment protection of °exibly employed lowered
down respectively.
The changes in the indices for °exibly employed should not be misinterpreted. A great
deal of changes are caused by °exibilization-driven transitions between employment cat-
egories. The °exicurity indices for °exibly employed re°ect average e®ects but not spe-
ci¯c causes of these transitions. Moreover, they restrict attention at the group of °exibly
employed, disregarding normally employed. Therefore, analyzing the indices of °exicurity
should be done with keeping eye on dynamics of employment categories. Comparisons with
the development of the indices for all employed also provide a more general outlook and ex-
plain where the improvements come from and at which price. For instance, if the strictness
of EPL for °exibly employed increases but of all employed decreases then, most likely, the
share of normally employed feeds the share of °exibly employed with a hight employment
status.
41Table 10: Yearly country indices Strictness of EPL / Security / ( Strictness of




in conditional % (liberal concept) Ranks














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































42Figure 5: Flexibility-Security nexus for all employed (liberal perspective) in the background
of liberals' diagonal °exicurity isolines

































































































































43Table 11: Yearly country indices Strictness of EPL / Security / (Strictness of




in conditional % (trade-unionist concept) Ranks














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































44Figure 6: Flexibility-Security nexus for °exibly employed only (trade-unionist perspective)
in the background of trade unions' vertical °exicurity isolines of ¯rst priority





























































































































45In actuality, however, the price of certain advantages for °exibly employed is non-comparable
with disadvantages for regularly employed. The latter are so signi¯cant that the general aver-
age trend is essentially negative. This disproportion in °exicurity advantages/disadvantages
is unambiguously illustrated in Figure 5 which re°ects the factual situation of all workers
in general. This means that relatively few °exibly employed little bene¯t from signi¯cant
losses of much more numerous normally employed. It is certainly not the appropriate price
for °exicurity advantages.
Thus, during the last decade the situation of °exibly employed in certain European coun-
tries has visibly improved. It would be a trade unions' victory, if the situation improved
ceteris paribus, not having been aggravated by other factors. Not necessary to emphasized
that a growth in indices of °exibly employed due to transitions from regular employment
does not enjoy trade unions.
10 Accuracy of the indices
To complete the study, estimate total errors ¾ in country indices Strictness of EPL and
Security, and in utility (Flexibility+Security)/2, which result from using ranks instead of
metrical estimates in the ¯rst-level security indicators. Fix a country and year, and do the
following:
² Since the EPL-index is not based on ranking, assume its `ordinal rounding error' to be
0.
² For every employment group g obtain the summary error ¾g. For this purpose use
formula (3) with equal weights ak = 1
5 of partial criteria, as speci¯ed in the bottom-
right section of Table 9:
¾g =
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
0 for Stricteness of EPL
1
5
v u u t
5 X
k=1
rgk(Rk ¡ rgk + 1)








rgk(Rk ¡ rgk + 1)
(Rk + 1)2(Rk + 2)




g is the number of employment group, e.g., g = 1 is Permanently full-time employed,
g = 2 is Permanently part-time employed, etc.,
k is the number of Security partial criterion, e.g., k = 1 is Unemployment insurance,
k = 2 is Pension, etc.,
rgk is the integer-valued rank of employment group g with respect to partial criterion
k; see Tables 4{8 (this group in the given country (and year) is ranked with regard
to other employment groups in di®erent countries (in di®erent years)), and
Rk is the maximal rank under partial criterion k; see captions to Tables 4{8.
46² For given country and year denote by eg the size of employment group g = 1;:::;8.
Then the total error in the country index in the given year is the weighted average of
the group's summary errors ¾g:4
¾ =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > <
















eg¾g (Trade-unionist concept) :
(5)
Substitute three types of summary errors (4) into (5) and obtain three total errors for
di®erent indices.
The yearly total errors for country's three indices computed in this way constitute triple
cells of Table 12, or 13, respectively. The last column of the tables provides the maximal
total index error during the control period 1994{2004.
11 Discussion
Who is interested in °exicurity? Thus, according to the liberal viewpoint, the relax-
ation of the EPL required by employers can be equivalently compensated by better social
security bene¯ts to workers. Flexicurity is thereby a particular manifestation of social com-
promise, discussed since Rousseau's (1762) Social Contract.
Since changes in the EPL are required by employers, the compromise tends to meet their
interests ¯rst, although Wilthagen and Tros (2004) argue for 'win-win strategies' (p. 173)
in 'positive sum games' (p. 179). However, it seems that even if prosperous enterprises o®er
additional bene¯ts to workers, the general pro¯t distribution is unlikely to be fair, taking
into account the income scissors between workers and owners with top managers.
A trade-o® in the liberal concept of °exicurity is a chain of compromises, meaning that
°exibility and security are opposed to each other. Since a relaxation of the employment
protection legislation requires a compensation, °exibilization is implicitly recognized `socially
bad' (otherwise what is the compensation for?). One can ask the questions: If °exibilization
is `socially bad', why not to abolish it? Why not to move along the same indi®erence curve
in the opposite direction, towards a stricter employment protection legislation accompanied
by a reduction of social security? At least, it could release considerable social security funds
with no loss in the social utility.
Since this possibility is not discussed, there should be some motivation exclusively for
°exibilization. Since a °exicurity policy along a trade-o® results in no increment in social
4Given a criterion and a country, ranks of employment groups are not independent. Consequently, the
summary scores of employment groups are dependent, and the total index error ¾ cannot be found from the











Therefore, the less advantageous formulas (5) are used to include correlation e®ects.
47Table 12: Total standard error ¾ in estimating Strictness of EPL / Security / (Strictness of
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48Table 13: Total standard error ¾ in estimating Strictness of EPL / Security / (Strictness of
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49utility, the motivation is beyond the social preference. In other words, someone `beyond the
society' wins from °exibilization but not the society which gets no advantages. Therefore,
the understanding of °exicurity as a trade-o® cannot be a `win{win strategy'. At best it is
a `win|no-win-no-loss' policy with a `positive sum' but not for the society.
Obviously, every step towards a higher °exibility always meets interests of employers
regardless of the state of social security. Business gets rid of restrictions, managers improve
performance by rotating personnel, and ¯rms gain higher pro¯ts. All expenses are recovered
by the state which arranges everything: paves the way for a favorable public opinion, accepts
new laws, and provides compensations to workers in the form of additional social security
bene¯ts. One can argue that employers, having got advantages, gain higher pro¯ts, pay more
taxes, and thereby re¯ll governmental funds. It is however unlikely that all the additional
tax-returns will be channelled to social security but not to other purposes and that ¯rms'
share in this ¯nancial loop will be enough modest to be socially fair. Therefore, such a
°exibilization scenario leads not only to a liberalization of the economy but also turns out to
be a long-running indirect governmental donation to ¯rms. Since the state budget originates
from taxpayers, that is the employees who contribute to the donation.
Which are the doubts? Trade unions put in question the main argument of adherents
of °exicurity as a trade-o®, that su±ciently high social guarantees can compensate an
increment in the risk to loose a job. Let us outline the train of thought which `disproves'
the argument. Assume that an increment in the risk to loose a job can be compensated by a
su±ciently high increment in guaranteed social bene¯ts, that is, in income and status. Then
one arrives inductively step-by-step to the extreme case, when the growing risk to loose the
job turns into certainty, while the social compensation remains adequate. It means that for
(almost) every employee the loss of his/her employment can be adequately compensated by
social security in income and status. Then very few individuals will be motivated to work,
and the resulting low production will not cover high expenditures for social security. This
economical contradiction shows that every relaxation of EPL can be compensated by social
security bene¯ts only partially but never completely.
Even if it were possible to more or less adequately compensate a decrement in the strict-
ness of EPL by social security advantages, entrusting the workers' welfare to the welfare-giver,
the state, would be too risky. Indeed, every political turn or economic recession may result in
easily realizable social cuts (as now in Germany). Employment protection, on the contrary,
guarantees jobs and, consequently, a stable income even during recessions and political crises
(Bewley 1999).
The next point is that non-benevolently changing jobs destroys career prospects. Since
past achievements play a little role, each time one must begin from the start and establish
oneself anew. Since the acquired experience can be insu±cient, it is often necessary to
learn new skills and to accommodate to the new environment. Besides, one can be obliged
to move from one place to another which complicates the family life. All of these can be
psychologically di±cult, time-consuming, and little successful, especially at an older age.
Finally, it is often emphasized that the °exicurity as a trade-o® is advantageous for social
bene¯ciaries. For employees it turns out that the already incomplete social security compen-
sation for their labour rights is further reduced in favor of `weaker groups' (otherwise, where
to take resources from? In fact, all money paid to anybody is subtracted from somebody).
50Moreover, the compensation for employees in the form of social security looks as a charity
rather than as a reward for their contribution to the national economy. This ethical nuance
damages the civil image of employees, equalizing them to non-employed.
How to unify values? Summing up what has been said, the liberal understanding of
°exicurity as a trade-o® implies one-sided advantages for employers and undesirable con-
sequences for employees. Preferences of liberals and trade unions more than just di®er,
they di®er in the type of preference. Liberals have a hill-shaped utility with gradual
ascents/descents in every direction. Trade-unions have a stair-like utility with gradual as-
cents/descents only along the `°ight of stairs' but with leaps in all other directions. What
liberals suggest as a subject for `deliberate' bargaining| determining the slope of social
trade-o®|is questionable for trade unions whose preference has no indi®erence curves which
might have a slope.
It meets the remark of Wilthagen and Tros' (2004, p. 169): `some recent studies are
pessimistic that appropriate trade-o®s can be found between °exibility and security'. In p.
181 they even more speci¯cally point at the problem of the very existence of trade-o®s: `If
these levels ::: do not exist, negotiations and trade-o®s are hard to envisage, because there
is `no more/or less' situation.'
Thus, the critical component of °exicurity is the Utility function which incorporates the
view at social values and implies trade-o®s. One possibility of making it operational and
transparent is to identify the social utility with the labour market performance. The labour
market performance, being little dependent on Flexibility reported in empirical studies,
can depend on the combination Flexibility and Security. Such a utility function could be
acceptable for liberals and convincing for trade unions.
Flexicurity as a trade-o® of utility function `labour market performance'. The
°exicurity trade-o®s can be level curves of the function of unemployment rate in variables
`°exibility' and `security'. Such a function can be empirically estimated by ¯tting the re-
gression (hyper)plane to European survey data provided °exibility and security factors being
represented by numerical indices. The casual relation `°exibility-security!unemployment'
can be considered with a delay of one year. A trade-o® with respect to such a function can
convince trade unions, providing a basis for bargaining.
Similarly, °exicurity trade-o®s can be determined from the index of economic performance
(weighted sum of indicators of unemployment, GDP growth, in°ation, and increase in public
debt) estimated as a function of °exibility and security.
If the idea of the second component of °exicurity, Flexibility, is clearly linked to a relax-
ation of EPL, the idea of the third °exicurity component, Security, remains quite vague. A
simple solution could be as follows.
Flexicurity as `social insurance' for °exibily employed. Since all types of °exibility
are projected on the one-dimensional money-compensation bargaining axis, the role of social
security becomes similar to that of health insurance or life insurance, which rates depend only
on risk and sum of compensation. The employer contributions to social security (» rates)
can be double-progressive, depending both on wage (» the insurance compensation) and
51°exibility of the contract (» risk of unemployment). Flexibly employed can be additionally
`insured' similarly to the additional health insurance for the medical expenses not recognized
by the state.
This way the social security system receives contributions, corresponding to the social
risk of insured. The employers are less rigidly constrained then under the employment
protection legislation. Flexibly employed enjoy equal or even more generous social bene¯ts
than permanently employed (due to the additional insurance for °exibly employed). Finally,
the society ¯nds the consensus by equilibrating the supply and demand for all degrees of
employment °exibility.
12 Conclusions
The given study operationalizes liberal and trade-unionist concepts of °exicurity, suggests
the corresponding indices, provides an empirical investigation of 16 European countries, and
outlines some prospects.
1. (Composition of the index) The Flexicurity index is based on statistical data on (a)
the size of eight employment groups (b) scores of the employment protection legislation
available from the OECD, (c) ¯ve security rank-based indicators obtained from juridical
data, and (d) weight coe±cients with which these indicators are accounted.
2. (Analytic capacities) The Flexibility{ Security indices provide quantitative tools for
analysis of current policies and comparing viewpoints of liberals and trade unions.
3. (Methodology) The study proposes some practical devices for constructing indices
from qualitative (juridical) data. The Method of Total Ranks can sometimes overcome
the dependence on `irrelevant alternatives' inherent in ranking.
4. (Accuracy estimates) The index is based on rankings which are rounded `latent'
metrical scores with a certain rounding error. The error can be reduced by applying
more levels of ranking of the juridical cases and by considering more security criteria.
5. (Empirical observations) The ¯rst quantitative analysis shows that the practical
implementation of °exicurity is far behind its theory. Minor advantages for °exibly
employed turn into great disadvantages for regularly employed with a negative general
balance.
6. (Practical solutions) Operationalizing the notion of °exicurity and keeping it under
instrumental control with empirical feedback can contribute to ¯nding e±cient and
acceptable forms of social consent.
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